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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Department of Defense (DoD) has been under close 
scrutiny by Congress over the past two decades because of 
its inability to field major defense acquisitions on time 
and within budget [Ref. 1:p. 21].  Previous attempts by DoD 
to reform its acquisition process have met with limited 
success.  The attempt initiated in 1994 strives to reform 
the procurement process by examining every step in the 
process and determining if there is a better way to do 
business.  Some of the central themes to the acquisition 
reform initiative include adopting commercial business 
practices, use of Integrated Product and process 
Development (IPPD) and Integrated Product Teams (IPTs), 
Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV), and use of 
Performance Specifications vice Military Design 
Specifications. [Ref. 2]  
In 1996, the Logistics Strategic Plan prepared by the 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (USD) for Logistics and 
promulgated by the Deputy USD for Acquisition and 
Technology stated that the DoD Logistics System would meet 
the vision of providing reliable, flexible, cost effective 
and prompt logistics support, information and service to 
the warfighter.  The DoD is to meet this vision proactively 
by making investments into technology, training, process 
reengineering, and employing the successful commercial and 
governmental practices. [Ref. 3:p. 10]  The Department's 
latest vision for acquisition was published in DoDD 5000.1 
and DoD Instruction 5000.2, effective October 23, 2000. 
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[Ref. 4]  These regulations further direct decision-makers 
to take all appropriate enabling actions to integrate 
acquisition and logistics to ensure a superior product 
support process. [Ref. 5]  
Program Managers (PM) for major defense acquisition 
programs are ultimately responsible for logistics 
management activities throughout the system development 
process, in order to ensure the design and acquisition of 
cost effective, supportable systems.  This includes the 
long-term goal of providing the warfighter with the 
necessary support infrastructure to achieve readiness 
requirements. [Ref. 3:p. 28.]  PMs have many tools 
available to assist them in managing their programs but 
there is no substitution for experience.  PMs must also 
draw upon the experiences of others to avoid repeating 
mistakes.  Lessons learned from successful programs are 
published so that everyone within the acquisition community 
can see which initiatives were successful and which ones 
were not.  This case examines the lessons learned in the 
application of Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) in 
the acquisition of the Marine Corps’ Advanced Amphibious 
Assault Vehicle (AAAV) program. 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this research is to examine the 
program decision to utilize RCM in the Marine Corps AAAV 
program.  The goal is to determine what impact this 
decision has had on the AAAV program, the future 
implications of this decision and to determine if this 
decision can benefit other defense acquisition programs.  
The research includes conducting a thorough review of the 
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RCM process to include actual RCM training provided on site 
at the AAAV program, a review of pertinent program 
documents, conducting interviews with program 
representatives, and conducting an analysis of the critical 
decision to utilize the RCM process.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question is: What have been the 
results of applying the RCM process in the acquisition of 
the Marine Corps AAAV and what are the reliability 
expectations associated with the further development, 
production and deployment of the AAAV?  The subsidiary 
research questions are as follows:  
· What is Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM)? 
· What are the current acquisition guidelines for 
reliability? 
· How has the AAAV program utilized RCM? 
· How might an analysis of the AAAV PMO decision to 
utilize the RCM be used in the successful 
execution of other DoD acquisition programs? 
D. SCOPE 
The scope of this case is limited to determining what 
RCM lessons can be learned from the AAAV.  The study will 
analyze both the RCM process and the application of RCM 
made within the PMO.  
E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this research consisted of the 
following: (1) a literature search of books, articles and 
other documents relating to RCM, the federal acquisition 
process and the AAAV program, (2) a review of available 
AAAV program related material, and (3) personal, 
telephonic, and e-mail interviews with personnel assigned 
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to the AAAV PMO, Marine Corps Systems Command, and General 
Dynamics (the prime contractor for the AAAV). 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This thesis is organized in the following manner: 
Chapter I presents the background and research questions 
for the study.  Chapter II examines the generic RCM process 
and DoD policy on RCM.  Chapter III examines the 
application of RCM to the acquisition of the AAAV.  Chapter 
IV analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of RCM in the 
AAAV program.  Finally, Chapter V contains the conclusions 
drawn from the research and recommendations for actions 
that can be taken. 
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II RELIABILITY CENTERED MAINTENANCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will examine the generic RCM process, 
which provides one source of innovation in maintenance 
management that has proven its value in both commercial and 
military applications.  RCM has helped develop management 
policies and improve reliability in a wide variety of 
applications through a methodical approach that ensures an 
organization’s maintenance management plan is efficient in 
addressing high operational tempos, fiscal constraints, 
personnel shortages, scarcity of resources, aging 
equipment, safety awareness, and environmental integrity.  
RCM has the potential to ensure reliability is accounted 
for in our military assets, but there is little reference 
to the process in official DoD wide regulations.   
B. RCM DEFINED 
RCM is a process used to determine what must be done 
to ensure that any physical asset continues to do what its 
users want it to do in its present operating context. [Ref. 
6]  This is a simple statement, but contains crucial 
changes in the way maintenance is defined.  The RCM process 
refocuses thinking in four significant ways: 
1.  The objective of a successful preventive 
maintenance program should be to prevent or 
mitigate the consequences of failures, not to 
prevent the failures themselves.  Failures cannot 
be prevented.  For example, if a wheel bearing on 
a car starts making noise (an indication that it 
is failing), it’s likely that it will be 
replaced.  This does not prevent the failure of 
the bearing but instead, avoids the consequences 
of the eventual failure.  Of the numerous 
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possible failure modes on any piece of equipment 
or system, each has a potentially different 
effect on safety, operations, the environment or 
costs.  It is this effect or consequence that 
should determine what, if any, attention should 
be used to address these occurrences.  This leads 
to the ultimate maintenance management conclusion 
that if the consequence of a failure does not 
adversely affect safety, operations, the 
environment or costs, then there is no need to 
perform any scheduled preventive maintenance at 
all. 
2.  The consequences of a failure will differ 
depending on the operating context of the asset.  
For example, an automobile that a farmer uses to 
run between his house and his barn (1 mile away) 
will probably not be subjected too much scheduled 
car care since its failure has minor consequences 
(a short walk to the barn).  However, if this 
same car was going to be used to travel across 
the country, the prudent owner will likely invest 
the money and time to ensure that all recommended 
maintenance be performed and that the vehicle is 
roadworthy prior to such a trip. The consequences 
of failure in this context (possibly 2,000 miles 
away from home) are far more significant than 
those in the context of the farmer’s car.  A 
formal review of failure consequences focuses 
attention on maintenance efforts that avoid 
serious consequences and diverts energy away from 
those with little or no effect.  
3.  There is a growing realization that in some 
cases, scheduled preventive maintenance (PM) can 
actually be detrimental.  Performing certain 
tasks causes an otherwise stable system to be 
destabilized and can lead to maintenance-induced 
failures.  Consider the case of a ball or roller 
bearing supporting a drive shaft.  An ill-advised 
PM service may call for the replacement of the 
bearing at some interval (say 2 years).  Since 
almost all bearings follow a completely random 
failure pattern, the time-based replacement of 
this bearing in the absence of any failure 
indicators provides an opportunity to incorrectly 
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install the “new” bearing and arguably throws 
away a perfectly good “old” bearing.  Although 
actuarial data is virtually non-existent, it’s 
interesting to note observations of Marine Corps 
ground equipment over the past 25 years.  In 
garrison, heavy emphasis is given to ensuring 
that all scheduled PM is accomplished precisely 
as specified in the applicable technical manual.  
In the field and particularly during extended 
operations however, “scheduled” PM all but falls 
by the wayside and at the same time, equipment 
availability and reliability seem to noticeably 
increase.  The theory is that in garrison, there 
is more opportunity to induce failure by 
performing scheduled services.  More often than 
not, the traditional PM that has not been 
validated by the RCM process will lack the focus 
of doing the job right. [Ref. 13]  
4. The final paradigm change is that instead of 
being concerned about what we want a process or 
piece of equipment to “be,” we should focus on 
what we want it to “do.”  In order to achieve 
this focus, the functions (or requirements) for 
the item must be clearly and precisely 
understood.  It is only when the functions (what 
the item must “do”) are fully defined that 
functional failures and the specific failure 
modes that cause them can be identified.  And it 
is only when failure modes and their effects are 
understood that an effective management policy 
can be established to avoid the consequences of 
each failure mode.  
RCM builds on these simple ideas to determine 
applicable and effective maintenance management plans for 
each failure. [Ref. 7]  
C. RCM BACKGROUND 
RCM was developed over a period of thirty years, but 
was first defined in 1978 by Stan Nowlan and Howard Heap in 
a report titled Reliability-Centered Maintenance 
commissioned by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD).  
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Since then, and most notably within the last decade, RCM 
has attracted considerable attention, both from potential 
users and from consulting firms’ eager to turn those users 
into clients.  One result has been a confusing abundance of 
processes offered by consultants under the name "RCM."  
Consequently, numerous organizations have attempted to 
bring order to this situation by publishing standards for 
RCM. [Ref. 8] 
The first industry to attempt a detailed examination 
of the effects of equipment failure was the aviation 
industry.  The Air Transport Association challenged many of 
the widely held beliefs on maintenance and developed a new 
framework to guide the development of scheduled maintenance 
programs for new airliners with the goal of ensuring that 
all assets continue to perform, as its users want them to 
perform.  Although as the Maintenance Steering Group 1 
(MSG1) and MSG2 (predecessors to MSG3) documents 
revolutionized the procedures for developing maintenance 
programs for aircraft, their application to other types of 
equipment was limited by their brevity and specialized 
focus. [Ref. 6]  
The Nowlan and Heap report revealed the success that 
commercial aviation had enjoyed with their revolutionary 
approach to scheduled maintenance and DoD hoped to benefit 
from this new process.  In the mid-1980s, the services 
published Military Standards and Specifications to guide 
contractors in using RCM to develop maintenance programs 
for new military equipment.  In June of 1995, the U.S. 
Secretary of Defense established a new policy, DoD 
Instruction 4151.18, to rely on commercial standards 
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instead of the traditional military standards for major 
acquisition programs.  Unfortunately for the Defense 
logistics community, there was no commercial standard 
outside of civil aviation that fully described RCM.  
In October 1999, the Society of Automotive Engineers 
(SAE) published the first all-industry commercial standard 
for RCM.  SAE JA1011, Evaluation Criteria for RCM 
Processes, established the minimum criteria a process must 
include to be called an "RCM" process. [Ref. 9]  The SAE 
committee chair, Dana Netherton, ensured the standard did 
not attempt to define a specific RCM process, but rather 
provided a basis for those interested in ascertaining 
whether companies were indeed providing true RCM services.  
This is a key point because there are many organizations 
that claim to provide RCM services but have taken the 
liberty to remove key portions in an attempt to shortcut 
the process to make a quicker profit.  Some of these 
processes may have achieved the same goals, but a few were 
counterproductive and some were even dangerous. [Ref. 10] 
The military aviation communities were the first DoD 
participants to take advantage of the RCM process, since 
the original studies were tailored towards commercial 
aviation.  RCM within commercial aviation has evolved over 
the years and the commercial aviation industry and the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) know the current 
version of RCM as MSG3.  Ironically, the RCM process seems 
to have been ignored for most existing ground mobility 
equipment (i.e., truck, tanks, tractors etc.)  As a result, 
industries seeking minimum effort, inexpensive, quick fix 
solutions have been disappointed.  Consequently, RCM has 
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received mixed reviews in its application in general 
industry. [Ref. 11]    
D. RCM FUNDAMENTALS 
As previously mentioned, the Society of Automotive 
Engineers published the all-industry commercial standard 
for RCM.  SAE JA1011 states that in order to be called a 
RCM process; it must obtain satisfactory answers to these 
seven questions, which must be asked in this order: 
1.  What are the functions and associated desired 
standards of performance of the asset in its 
present operating context (functions)?  
2.  In what ways can it fail to fulfill its 
functions (functional failures)?  
3.  What causes each functional failure (failure 
modes)?  
4.  What happens when each failure occurs 
(failure effects)?  
5.  In what way does each failure matter (failure 
consequences)?  
6.  What should be done to predict or prevent 
each failure (proactive tasks and task 
intervals)?  
7.  What should be done if a suitable proactive 
task cannot be found (default actions)?  [Ref. 9] 
What are the functions and associated performance 
standards of the asset in its present operating condition?  
Before it is even possible to apply a process used to 
determine what must be done to ensure that any physical 
asset continues to do whatever its users want it to do in 
its present operating context, we need to do two things: 
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determine what it’s users want it to do and ensure that it 
is capable of doing what it’s users want to start with. 
[Ref. 6]  This is precisely why the first step in the 
process is to define the functions in the proper context 
with the desired expectations.  This user expectation can 
be broken down into primary and secondary functions.  
Primary functions would include factors such as speed, 
output, capacity, quality, or customer service.  Secondary 
functions might include safety, control, comfort, 
efficiency, environmental compliance and appearance.  Users 
know these functions better than anyone else does, so it is 
essential that they be included in the RCM process from the 
beginning. 
Until a group becomes thoroughly versed in the RCM 
process, defining functions can take up to one-third of the 
total time involved in an analysis.  This is because for 
many, RCM is the first process that forces them to describe 
in accurate detail, what they want something to do instead 
of generically describing what they want it to be.  This 
part of the RCM process has an added benefit in that; it 
brings the team together as they learn as group how the 
equipment actually works.  
In what ways does the equipment or system fail to 
fulfill its functions?  At what point is the loss of 
performance unacceptable?  These questions force an RCM 
group to clearly describe at what point they consider that 
the equipment has “failed.”  RCM defines this condition as 
a “functional failure,” because when one occurs, an asset 
cannot perform its function to the user’s standard. 
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What causes each functional failure?  Once functional 
failures have been identified, the next step is to try to 
identify all of the events (failure modes) that are 
reasonably likely to cause the failed state.  Likely 
failures include those that have occurred on the same or 
similar equipment while operating in the same context, 
failures that are currently being prevented by some 
existing practice (i.e., preventive maintenance) and 
failures that have not happened but are real possibilities.  
RCM also considers failure modes that are thought to be 
unlikely, but if they should occur, would have extremely 
serious consequences, such as death or a catastrophic 
environmental breach.  Most failures are caused by 
deterioration, normal wear and tear, human error, and 
design flaws.  The key is to be able to identify each 
failure in enough detail to be able to put together an 
appropriate failure management policy.  Verbs such as 
‘fails’ or ‘breaks’ or ‘malfunctions’ are too generic in 
most cases to develop an effective management solution; 
therefore, RCM suggests that review groups describe failure 
modes with much greater precision.  This is of extreme 
importance because in many instances, the effects of a 
failure are confused with the mode of the failure. 
As a result, many maintenance policies have been 
created that manage failure effects instead of failure 
modes.  For example, consider the case of a geared 
hydraulic pump driven by a shaft.  Consider now one 
possible failure of the shaft: “shaft shears.”  If the 
shaft is built to minimum standards with little or no 
safety margin, it is possible that the shaft could shear 
due to fatigue.  In this case, the failure mode should read 
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“shaft shears due to fatigue” and it’s possible that a 
management policy (i.e., design a stronger shaft, inspect 
shaft every XXX hours and replace if worn, reduce load on 
pump, etc.) based on the operating context of the pump can 
be developed.  However, if the shaft is built to greater, 
robust standards, the shaft shearing is much more likely to 
be an effect of some other failure mode (i.e., pump seized, 
motor over speed, improper installation) and any management 
policy directed at the shaft would be unlikely to avoid the 
consequences of the pump failing.      
What happens when each failure occurs?  It is 
important to describe the effects of each failure mode and 
in doing so, describe them fully and as if nothing is being 
done to predict or prevent the failure.  In describing the 
effects, the following questions should be addressed: What 
evidence is there that a failure has occurred?  In what 
ways does the failure pose a threat to the environment or 
to safety?  How does it affect operations or production?  
What physical damage is caused by the failure?  What must 
be done to repair the failure?  If the effects are not 
complete, it is possible that the consequences of the 
failure will be understated and that an improper and 
possibly deadly management policy will ensue.   
In what way does each failure matter?  This question 
established the consequences of each failure mode and is at 
the heart of establishing a management policy.  Since not 
every possible failure mode can realistically be addressed 
with the same vigor, the ones that have serious 
consequences will be the ones that we will go to great 
lengths to avoid.  One of the strengths of RCM is the 
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recognition that the consequences of failures are more 
important that their technical characteristics.  The real 
reason for doing proactive maintenance is not to avoid 
failures, but to avoid or reduce the consequences of 
failure.   
The RCM process classifies consequences into one of 
five distinct categories: hidden failures, safety, 
environmental, operational, and non-operational with hidden 
being viewed as most important and non-operational as the 
least.  As a general rule, hidden failures describe the 
failure of protective devices that in and of themselves 
have no direct consequence.  However, when coupled with 
another failure (a “multiple failure” in RCM terms), the 
consequences can be severe.  RCM gives these top priorities 
because in many instances, the existence of the protective 
devices is unknown to the user of the asset.  As an example 
of a hidden failure, consider a low oil pressure shut-off 
switch on an engine.  If the engine oil pressure is within 
normal limits and the switch is failed, it does not matter.  
The only time the failed switch matters is when oil 
pressure drops; the multiple failure.  A failure has safety 
consequences if it could injure or kill someone and has 
environmental consequences if it violates corporate or 
governmental environmental standards.  A failure has 
operational consequences if it affects output, quality, 
service or operating cost and finally, if none of the 
former apply, the consequences of the failure is said to be 
“non-operational.”  
RCM uses the above categories as the framework for 
decision-making.  This helps to shift emphasis away from 
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the thought that all failures “matter” and must be 
prevented.  By focusing maintenance resources on those 
failure modes that matter, energy and resources are not 
wasted on those that have little or no effect.  This also 
forces managers to look for innovative ways to manage 
failure rather than concentrating only on failure 
prevention.  Failure management can be divided into two 
categories, proactive tasks or default actions.  Proactive 
tasks such as preventive maintenance or scheduled 
restoration are performed before the failure happens.  
Default actions are considered when a proactive task is not 
possible and includes failure finding, redesign, or run to 
failure.  
What can be done to predict or prevent each failure?  
Historically, the belief was that the best way to optimize 
equipment availability was some type of proactive 
maintenance on a scheduled basis.  The assumption was that 
most equipment operates reliably for a period of time and 
then wears out; the assumption that everything has a 
“life.”  Recent studies, however, have revealed that 
equipment does not always behave as we thought it once did 
and that not everything has a life that can be used to 
develop maintenance policies.  As the understanding of how 
equipment behaves has increased, so has the realization 
that in some cases, the more often equipment is overhauled, 
the more likely it is to fail.  This is referred to as 
introducing infant mortality into an otherwise stable 
system. [Ref. 12]  With this in mind, some organizations 
have chosen to arbitrarily abandon all forms of preventive 
maintenance, but this can lead to significant failure 
consequences.  The RCM solution is to examine each failure 
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mode on its own and through a disciplined process, 
establish whether or not a proactive task is applicable.  
RCM suggests one of three possibilities for proactive 
tasks and addresses them in the order of easiest/least 
expensive to most expensive.  The first consideration is 
for an ”on-condition” task.  An on-condition task is a 
scheduled check to see if something is giving an indication 
or warning that it is failing: a noisy bearing, for 
example.  If it is indicating imminent failure, corrective 
maintenance is performed.  If it is not, nothing is done 
until the next check.  In other words, maintenance actions 
are based on the condition of the asset.  The second 
consideration is scheduled restoration and the third is 
scheduled discard.  In these cases, an item is either 
restored or discarded at a prescribed interval regardless 
of the condition of the “old” item at the time.  Only 
components that have an “expected life” will fall into a 
scheduled restoration or discard regime and RCM establishes 
clear guidelines to decide which is the most appropriate 
based on the failure mode under review.  With that said, 
between 75-89% components do not have a life and thus, 
proactive tasks are not technically feasible and scheduled 
maintenance can be argued as counterproductive. [Ref. 13]    
What if a suitable proactive task cannot be found?  If 
a proactive task cannot be found then a default action must 
be considered.  Default actions include failure finding, 
re-design and no scheduled maintenance and are based on the 
consequences of the failure mode.  For example, in the case 
of hidden failures, if a proactive task cannot be found, or 
if a suggested task does not reduce the risk of multiple 
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failures to a tolerable level, then a scheduled failure 
finding task may be prescribed.  Failure finding involves 
checking to ensure that the device is still working.  In 
the case of the low oil pressure switch described earlier, 
a failure finding task might involve removing the switch 
and checking its operation on a test bench to ensure that 
it sent the proper signal when oil pressure was reduced to 
a prescribed level.  If a suitable failure finding task 
cannot be found, and the consequences of failure include 
either safety or the environment, redesign is compulsory.  
If the consequences do not affect safety or the 
environment, no scheduled maintenance is prescribed and 
redesign may be desirable.  RCM suggests that if a suitable 
proactive task cannot be found for any failure mode with 
safety and environmental consequences, then redesign is 
compulsory to prevent or reduce the consequences of the 
failure.  Nowadays, companies cannot afford safety and 
environmental mishaps since they come with large monetary 
penalties as well as damaged reputations.  If the failure 
has either operational or non-operational consequences then 
any proposed task must be economically justified.  If an 
economical task cannot be found, no scheduled maintenance 
is the default with redesign as an option.        
The approach discussed in the previous paragraphs 
calls for proactive tasks only when they are suitable for 
the specified failures mode.  This can clearly lead to a 
substantial decrease in routine scheduled workloads.  It is 
logical to reason that the fewer the number of scheduled 
tasks, the more likely it is that the tasks will all be 
properly completed.  This approach, plus the elimination of 
potentially counterproductive tasks, leads to a more 
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efficient and responsive maintenance program.  This is an 
important issue to appreciate.  When you think about it, in 
the traditional approach to developing maintenance 
procedures, the requirements for each asset were assessed 
in terms of technical characteristics without consideration 
to the consequences of failure.  These maintenance 
schedules would then be used as blanket policies for all 
other similar assets regardless of the different operating 
contexts and as a result, they led to unnecessary 
maintenance with a potential to induce more failures than 
they prevented.  These large numbers of schedules are 
really both a waste of time and resources, since they often 
achieve far less than was expected, and are sometimes 
counterproductive.  [Ref. 6] 
E. APPLYING RCM 
There are many references published describing the RCM 
process and organizations with limited funds to invest 
might be tempted to simply read the references and attempt 
to apply the process to “save money.”  Though the RCM 
process is seemingly straightforward and simple to 
comprehend, it should not be applied by anyone who has not 
been properly trained and mentored.  RCM is as much a 
scientific discipline as mechanical engineering or 
medicine.  Simply reading about RCM in a book, attending a 
short class on the subject, listening to a speaker describe 
the process at a symposium or observing the process being 
applied does not ensure that it can be successfully and 
effectively applied without proper follow-on training and 
mentoring.  If it were that simple, then anyone could pick 
up a copy of “Gray’s Anatomy,” read it from cover to cover, 
and be instantly qualified to diagnose ailments, prescribe 
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treatment and possibly perform surgery with no other 
training.  [Ref. 13]    
If RCM is correctly applied, results are quick to 
follow, however, success is more likely to come to those 
who thoroughly plan as well as carefully consider how and 
by whom the analysis is performed, audited and implemented.  
Meticulous preparation begins with defining the scope, 
boundaries and objectives of each project, and identifying 
a project manager, facilitators and participants by name.  
Additional planning includes determining the training for 
participants and facilitators, the details for each 
meeting, management audits of RCM recommendations, and 
deciding how to implement these recommendations. 
RCM should be first applied to systems where it is 
likely to get the biggest return relative to the effort 
required to achieve either tangible or intangible benefits.  
Tangible benefits include greater safety, improved 
equipment availability and reliability, better product 
quality and customer service, and lower operating or 
maintenance costs.  Intangible benefits include a better 
understanding of how the equipment works from the operator 
and maintainer point of view, improving teamwork, and 
increasing morale.  Hopefully these systems are self-
evident, but it may be necessary to prioritize the RCM 
projects before planning each project in detail.   
To prioritize and keep the process focused, RCM 
utilizes small teams of key personnel called review groups.  
These teams are necessary since a single person generally 
cannot effectively answer every one of the original seven 
questions discussed earlier.  The ideal group consists of 
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an engineering supervisor, craftsman, operations 
supervisor, operator, external technical or process 
specialist, and is led by a trained facilitator.  Each 
should have a thorough knowledge of the equipment under 
review and an understanding of the RCM process.  The idea 
is that management gains access to the knowledge and 
expertise of each team member, while the members themselves 
gain a greater appreciation for how the asset works.  This 
teamwork plays an integral part in the overall success of 
the process.   
The facilitators are the experts in RCM and thus 
ensure the entire process is understood and applied by the 
group.  Along the way, the facilitator ensures consensus is 
reached, commitment is retained, the process is finished as 
intended, and the effort stays on time.  The facilitator 
understands that the outcome should include schedules to be 
performed by the maintenance personnel, operating 
procedures for the users of the equipment, and proposals 
for one-time changes that must be made to the design of the 
equipment or the way it is operated.  The latter addresses 
the situations where the equipment could not deliver the 
desired performance in its current state.   
Senior management plays the role of auditor and 
ensures that the review is sensible and defensible.  This 
includes an agreement of both the definition of functions, 
performance standards, the identification of failure modes, 
the description of failure effects, the assessment of 
failure consequences and the selection of tasks.  This 
makes sense since they are ultimately responsible for the 
success or failure of the process.  Once management blesses 
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and approves the review, the changes are documented for all 
to understand and to comply with.  This includes changes to 
maintenance planning and control systems as well as 
Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs).  Proposals for 
modifications are dealt with by the engineering 
organization. [Ref. 6] 
F. RCM ACHIEVMENTS 
The outcomes of the RCM process are a means to an end.  
Specifically, they should fulfill the maintenance 
expectations discussed earlier in this chapter.  RCM 
achieves these goals through improved operating 
performance, more cost effective maintenance, greater 
environmental and safety integrity, and longer useful life 
of expensive equipment.  It also provides a comprehensive 
database, greater motivation among participants, and better 
teamwork.  The major feature of RCM is that it provides a 
step-by-step program for tracking all the achievements at 
once while involving everyone who has anything to do with 
the equipment in the process.   
The RCM process has proven to yield quick results 
which translate into timely, cost effective change that any 
organization could take advantage of.  For example, if RCM 
is applied to a legacy system with an established 
maintenance policy, it generally reduces fully developed 
scheduled maintenance tasks by between 40-70%, reduces 
material disposal fees by between 30-50% and reduces the 
total number of maintenance man-hours expended by 35-60%. 
[Ref. 14] 
Additionally, RCM has been refined to improve both 
clarity and user-friendliness.  This allows for the 
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principles to be successfully applied by those who are not 
highly experienced or academically trained maintenance 
management experts.  It is far more than a set of 
engineering principles, it is designed to empower and 
enhance the skills of the maintainers and users as well as 
provide a foundation for positive organizational change.  
G. ARGUMENTS AGAINST RCM  
There are a growing number of consulting organizations 
in commercial industry that claim to provide the “best” 
reliability centered maintenance processes.  Many attempt 
to show that their particular process is better than the 
others because it is “faster” or “streamlined.”  Some are 
simply watered down versions of Nowlan and Heap’s RCM while 
others take completely different approaches at providing 
their clients  “better” reliability for less effort and 
cost. 
While RCM II has been extremely successful (it has 
been applied in over 1,400 organizations in more than 40 
countries), RCM in general is not always successful.  It 
has failed in approximately one third of the organizations 
where it has been tried, either because the organizations 
concerned did not derive the benefits that they hoped to or 
the RCM initiative collapsed before it could yield much in 
the way of significant results.  This does not sound like 
an exemplary track record but two-thirds success is at 
least as good as, if not better than, the success rate 
achieved by major organizational change initiatives in 
general. [Ref. 8]  The key point is that none of the 
initiatives failed for technical reasons.  Without 
exception, the initiates failed for organizational reasons.    
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One common reason for RCM failure was the principal 
internal sponsor of the initiative quit the organization or 
moved to a different position before the new ways of 
thinking embodied in the RCM process were 
institutionalized.  Another common reason was between the 
internal sponsor and the consultant; neither could generate 
sufficient enthusiasm for the process for it to be applied 
in a way that yielded results.  Again, both of these 
reasons for failure revolve around people caring whether 
the process is a success, but not because of the process 
itself.  [Ref. 15] 
Since maintenance managers look mainly at tangible 
returns rather than the projected expected returns of 
carrying out RCM, the time it takes to see results is 
important.  RCM consultants advertise that, if properly 
trained people working under the direction of a skilled 
facilitator correctly apply RCM, and the project has been 
properly planned before it starts, it usually pays for 
itself between two weeks and two months.  In some cases the 
payback period has been measured in days and sometimes one 
or two years, but the norm is weeks to months. [Ref. 8]  
Competitive maintenance management programs such as Planned 
Maintenance Optimization (PMO2000) claim that, you will 
have these (hazardous problems) under control in one year, 
but if you use RCM it will take you six years. [Ref. 8]  
The facts simply don’t support this generalization. 
There is also the debate that RCM is only worth 
applying to high-risk industries such as petrochemicals, 
oil or gas and goes further to suggest that it would be a 
waste of time to apply RCM to mature plants or equipment.  
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Once again, the facts do not support this generalization 
since there are numerous examples in which RCM has led to 
successes in small (low risk) contexts as well as mature 
established industries. 
The lack of enough precise failure data for an 
engineering analysis may lead interested companies to 
believe that RCM can not be applied.  The reality is that, 
most of the organizations that apply RCM lack precise 
historical records about failures and some of the most 
successful users have had none at all. [Ref. 16]  RCM is 
able to overcome these obstacles by recognizing that most 
of the information needed to conduct a thorough analysis 
already exists in the minds of the operators and 
maintainers of the equipment on a daily basis.  RCM is 
designed to seek and capture the experiences of these 
people in systematic and highly effective fashion.  RCM 
also recognizes that the information needed to make 
sensible and defensible decisions will not always be 
available.  In this case, if the consequences of 
uncertainty were too intolerable, then the design or 
operation of the process would need to be changed.  
Planned Maintenance Optimization (PMO) seems to be the 
greatest competition to RCM.  The problem with PMO is that 
it starts not by defining the functions of the asset, which 
is specified by SAE JA1011, but starts with the existing 
maintenance tasks.  Users of this approach are then asked 
to try to identify the failure mode that each task is 
supposed to be preventing and then work forward again 
through the last three steps of the RCM decision process to 
reexamine the consequences of each failure and hopefully to 
  25 
identify a more cost effective failure management policy.  
This approach is similar to other emerging derivatives of 
RCM.  These include  “Streamlined RCM” or “RCM in Reverse” 
which are derivations of the Nowlan and Heap RCM that 
attempt to apply only some of the RCM steps, and “back-fit” 
RCM, which attempts to apply the RCM concepts in reverse. 
[Ref. 8]  
Since we understand the phrase, “time is money,” the 
proponents of PMO claim that their process achieves the 
same results as RCM in much less time.  Analysis indicates 
that they produce nothing like the same results as RCM, but 
they contain logical or procedural flaws which can increase 
risk to an extent that overwhelms any small advantage they 
might offer in reduced application costs.  By following the 
PMO process, companies take on the additional risk that any 
of the assumptions required might be wrong and thus the 
small advantage is ultimately lost. [Ref. 8] 
The bottom line is that the users who are concerned 
about the cost effectiveness of the maintenance management 
process they are considering, would be well advised to take 
the same measures they would take when embarking on the use 
of any other new process.  Decide what cost effectiveness 
metrics are important, then check the track record of that 
process and see what kind of experiences others have with 
it. [Ref. 8] 
H. DOD POLICY ON RCM  
The RCM process has been applied to thousands of 
organizations spanning nearly every major field of 
endeavor.  Though the military is included in a few of the 
successes, it is evident in the correspondence from senior 
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military leadership that there has been a lack of 
aggressiveness in pursuing all opportunities for its 
application.  Besides overcoming cultural change, perverse 
incentives, and a lack of adequate funding, the RCM process 
requires determined support from senior military 
leadership. [Ref. 17]  
There is a lot written on DoD acquisition reform and 
in many cases, the buzzword “reliability” can be easily 
found.  The issue is that there are numerous generalities 
that mention how important reliability is, but little 
reference as to how to achieve it.  Though the scope of 
this research does not include the strategies Program 
Managers should implement to maximize reliability, there 
are military examples in which RCM has accomplished the 
same reliability success that is so prevalent in commercial 
industry.     
With the lack of specific DoD-wide guidance and 
regulation on RCM, it appears that all military 
applications of the RCM process have been initiated by 
proactive individuals who have taken the time to learn 
about the process and realized its potential in their 
organization.  Each branch of service has had success.  The 
Navy utilizes the RCM process to incorporate reliability 
into its new procurements and in-service management of 
aviation assets [Ref. 18] as well as its ships’ maintenance 
[Ref. 19].  The Air Force objectives in implementing RCM 
are to reduce engine related Cost Per Engine Flying Hour 
(CPEFH) while continuing to ensure aircraft engines are 
safe and reliable. [Ref. 20]  The Army recommends RCM 
techniques to coordinate maintainability design efforts 
  27 
with maintenance planning in its acquisition process, [Ref. 
21] as well as calls for RCM logic to be used by all 
commands and activities to determine a maintenance program 
for fielded equipment systems. [Ref. 22]  The Coast Guard 
appears to be the first military organization that has 
successfully applied RCM to the acquisition of a complete 
asset in the development and construction of the USCGC 
Healy. [Ref. 23]   
While the Marine Corps partially defines RCM in its 
Acquisition Procedure Handbook [Ref. 24], there are no 
references to RCM in any other current service specific 
orders.  Although Marine acquisitions are guided by 
Secretary of the Navy Instructions (SECNAVINST) that 
briefly mention RCM as part of acquisition maintenance 
planning [Ref. 25] and supportability analysis, [Ref. 26] 
RCM is not mandated in either of these references.  
Moreover, RCM has not been incorporated into any USMC 
ground program because there are no USMC regulations or 
procedures governing RCM.  The Advanced Amphibious Assault 
Vehicle (AAAV) Program Manager’s decision to apply RCM to 
the program has been the result of proactive individuals 
guided primarily by initiative and the acknowledgement of a 
successful commercial business practice.  In the absence of 
specific guidance to the application of RCM to an 
acquisition program, AAAV has chosen to apply RCM because 
of its tremendous potential as will be examined in the 
following chapter.  
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III. RCM APPLICATION IN THE AAAV PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Marine Corps 
has no specific reference governing the application of 
Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) to the maintenance 
or acquisition of USMC ground programs.  It is interesting 
to note that without the initiative of key personnel 
involved in the AAAV program, RCM would have likely 
remained unnoticed.  This chapter will introduce the AAAV 
program, examine the reasons the program chose to utilize 
the RCM process, how RCM was applied, the obstacles that 
were faced, how these obstacles were overcome, the benefits 
realized and finally the long run expectations. 
B. ADVANCED AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT VEHICLE 
The United States Marine Corps’ Advanced Amphibious 
Assault Vehicle (AAAV), under development by the Direct 
Reporting Program Manager, Advanced Amphibious Assault 
(DRPM-AAA) and General Dynamics Amphibious Systems (GDAMS) 
will replace an Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) that was 
designed in the late 1960’s and subsequently fielded by the 
Marine Corps in 1972.  The AAAV program is the Marine 
Corps’ number one priority ground weapon system acquisition 
program, as well as the only ACAT 1D program managed by the 
Marine Corps.  The AAAV will allow the Navy and USMC to 
conduct operational maneuver from the sea, link maneuver in 
ships with maneuver ashore in all types of amphibious 
operations, and will provide a new capability in support of 
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare.  The AAAV will provide the 
capability to transport seventeen combat loaded infantrymen 
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over the water at speeds in excess of 20 knots, and once 
ashore, maneuver cross-country with agility and mobility 
equal to or greater than that of the M1 Tank. [Ref. 27]    
The program began with the Concept Exploration (CE) 
phase in August 1988 and in 1996 entered the Program 
Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR) Phase.  During PDRR, 
three prototypes were built; each was fully capable of all 
modes of operation.  As of this writing, the program is in 
the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase during 
which ten second-generation prototypes will be built and 
tested.  The first AAAVs are expected to be issued to fleet 
units in mid-2007 and some 1013 vehicles will be built 
between then and 2012. [Ref. 28] 
C. AAAV PROGRAM CHOICE TO UTILIZE RCM 
In keeping with acquisition reform initiatives 
pointing to better business practices, and to ensure that 
the Marine Corps is delivered a supportable asset with the 
lowest possible life cycle costs, DRPM-AAA undertook an 
initiative to apply RCM as defined by SAE JA1011 and 
initially, chose John Moubray’s “RCM II” for the AAAV.  
Moubray, Chief Executive of Aladon LLC, was invited to 
present a paper on his process at the Department of 
Defense-sponsored National Defense Industrial Association  
(NDIA) in St. Louis, Missouri in November 1999, and in 
attendance were both the AAAV Logistics Director and the 
Maintenance Officer.  Representatives from NAVAIR and the 
Royal Navy followed Moubray’s presentation; both extolled 
the power of RCM II and quantified the benefits of the 
process to their programs. 
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With only general references to RCM in Secretary of 
the Navy Instructions (SECNAVINST) and with no service 
specific guidance on the application of the process, credit 
must be given to the program Logistics Director and 
Maintenance Officer for the extent to which the AAAV 
program has applied RCM.  Through extensive research and 
sincere dedication towards making the AAAV a reliable and 
maintainable asset, these gentlemen were able to prove to 
the Program Manager that the RCM process would pay great 
dividends on the AAAV prototypes.  [Ref. 29]  Shortly after 
learning about RCM II at the NDIA symposium, the AAAV 
program office awarded Aladon LLC a sole source contract 
totaling $150,000 for a pilot initiative in the application 
of RCM.  This pilot was intended to demonstrate whether RCM 
was suitable for application to a prototype vehicle and to 
determine whether the investment in this process was 
worthwhile.  The initial pilot training program began in 
October 2000 and consisted of training approximately sixty 
program personnel, training and certifying five RCM 
facilitators and examining key AAAV systems to demonstrate 
actual results.  The pilot program also included 
facilitator mentoring, project technical support and 
presentations to senior leadership. [Ref. 30]   
In retrospect, the program team members would have 
preferred to implement RCM during the Component Advanced 
Development phase.  As it would be, two competitors had 
produced ¾ scale technology demonstrators (hydrodynamic and 
land test rigs) in order to prove their concepts.  After 
evaluating the two companies, the program down selected to 
GDAMS because there was more confidence in their ability to 
design and produce the AAAV.  The program recognizes that 
  32 
RCM could have played an integral part in this evaluation 
process. [Ref. 28]    
Additionally, the program took the ORD and used it to 
produce a system/subsystem specification (SSS).  In some 
cases, the SSS was rather ambiguous, while in others, more 
stringent than the ORD.  Had RCM been applied (particularly 
question 1 of the fundamental RCM questions that were 
described in Chapter II) to the SSS development process, it 
would have resulted in a much more granular document with 
far greater clarity and less chance for misinterpretation.  
The RCM team is confident that if their process had been 
used to analyze the systems at an earlier stage of the 
program, many of the “problems” identified during PDRR 
would have been avoided.  However, since the pilot program 
was not initiated until late in the PDRR phase, three 
prototypes had already been designed, built and were 
operating.  One prototype had been in testing for about 
eleven months, the second one was about 90% built and third 
was 25% built, so there was limited opportunity to 
influence the initial PDRR design through RCM.  The design 
was what it was and all the hardware had been bought.  
[Ref. 28] 
With three prototypes assembled and the program 
feeling the normal stresses involved in acquisition, the 
newly trained facilitators set out to convince themselves 
that this investment was worthwhile by conducting the first 
analyses on relatively simple systems with the potential 
for immediate payback.  The Marine Drive Steering system 
was chosen as one of the first analyses to be conducted.   
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The recommendations that flowed from these initial 
analyses quickly demonstrated to the facilitators’ the 
unique benefits of RCM.  For example, during early testing, 
one of the prototypes was plagued with uncommanded steering 
events in the water.  Although the designers were 
struggling to determine the cause of this, the Marine Drive 
Steering analysis revealed several failure modes that would 
contribute to the problem.  Among them was corrosion in 
wiring harnesses and when this was corrected on the 
prototype, the steering problems were solved.  During each 
of the pilot analyses, both facilitators and group members 
discovered that there was much more about the AAAV that 
designers, engineers, and technicians were not aware of, 
until RCM was applied. 
 Despite the goal of analyzing thirteen areas during 
the RCM pilot program by January 2001, only five analyses 
were completed.  The complexity of the AAAV and its 
subsystems was not immediately evident, even to an RCM 
practitioner with more than eighteen years of experience 
with the process and as a result, not all of the targeted 
areas were analyzed. [Ref. 31] 
Contributing to this problem was a lack of experienced 
facilitators.  The RCM process, when properly applied by an 
experienced facilitator, averages about six completed 
failure modes per hour; however, this speed is generally 
not achieved until a facilitator has completed between 
three and six analyses. [Ref. 13]  Nonetheless, the Program 
Manager was impressed with the dramatic results of the 
pilot program and in February 2001, a competitive contract 
for RCM training and mentoring was initiated.  Several 
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organizations submitted proposals for the contract, but 
extensive and exhaustive research revealed that only 
Aladon’s RCM II process was fully compliant with the SAE 
standard.  Furthermore, although other bidders’ processes 
had merit, none had ever been applied to a prototype.  As a 
result, Aladon was awarded the second RCM contract for an 
additional $250,000. [Ref. 28] 
Although GDAMS had never used RCM either, during 
negotiations for the SDD contract, they agreed to the 
Government’s request to replace requirements to perform 
Failure Modes and Effects Analyses (FMEA) and Failure 
Modes, Effects and Criticality Analyses (FMECA) with RCM.  
As a result, contract hours originally intended for 
FMEA/FMECA were shifted to RCM. 
In the beginning, there was resistance to the process 
since team members from both the Government and contractor 
thought, “We have already done a FMEA, why do we need to do 
RCM?”  However, as the results of analysis became known and 
as the significant benefits of the process was revealed, 
growing numbers of program personnel actively sought to 
participate.  The outputs from RCM analysis provided 
feedback to designers, logistics engineers, technical 
manual developers and troubleshooting developers, just to 
name a few. [Ref. 13] 
D. APPLICATION OF RCM  
When the program decided to use RCM in lieu to the 
traditional FMEAs, the program took the number of hours 
that would have been spent on FMEA and transferred them to 
RCM.  As a result, the SDD contract has approximately 4500 
contractor labor hours available for RCM analyses.  Out of 
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eight system level analyses, the program has used 1263 
hours with an approximate split of 421 for the Government 
and 824 for the contractor.  These analyses represent about 
forty percent of those planned for the entire AAAV but have 
only used a little more than twenty-five percent of the 
available time that would have been used to conduct FMEAs.    
RCM is incorporated into the integrated product team 
(IPT) process.  Analyses have been completed in as little 
as three meetings for a simple system and as many as 
twenty-five for a complex system.  Each meeting generally 
lasts for three hours and the analysis teams meet two or 
three times a week.  Based on a forty-hour workweek, this 
equates to approximately twenty to twenty-five percent of 
each member’s time for each analysis.  On occasion, 
meetings have been conducted on an eight-hour basis; 
however, this is the exception to the rule.  Experience has 
shown that three-hour meetings are optimal in terms of 
productivity of group members.  As the length of the 
meeting increases, productivity decreases because of the 
intense focus that RCM demands. [Ref. 28] 
Each analysis calls for one facilitator who spends an 
average of one hour outside the RCM meeting for every hour 
spent inside.  This time is typically spent typing 
information, generating reports, consolidating data, and 
preparing for the next meeting.  During an assigned 
analysis, the facilitator could spend approximately forty 
percent of his or her time on the analysis.  The program 
also has one RCM practitioner who spends sixty percent of 
his time mentoring facilitators, conducting technical 
audits, and providing training.  It is noted that the 
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analyses are sporadic, ranging from none being conducted to 
as many a four at one time.  
Though RCM training speeds up the analysis, the 
program found that the training was not absolutely 
necessary.  The first few days of analysis with untrained 
personnel merely take longer than they should because the 
RCM process has to be explained along the way, but the 
quality of the analysis is the same because the facilitator 
keeps the meeting focused on the objective.  With that 
said, retraining is not necessary either, since retraining 
essentially occurs while members participate in the 
analysis.     
The outputs from an RCM analysis are numerous and 
include a comprehensive list of failure modes and their 
effects, recommendations for preventive maintenance, and 
recommendations for changes in design.  In RCM II terms, 
design changes are not limited to physical changes to an 
asset.  Design changes can apply to changes to process and 
procedures changes to training methods and changes in 
technical documentation.  Recommended changes may also 
include changes to critical design reviews, required 
delivery documents, functional flow diagrams and a number 
of other things that engineers use to methodically weed 
through problems.     
After an RCM analysis has been completed, the 
facilitator consolidates the data contained in both 
information and decision worksheets and turns the entire 
report over to the system engineer who is responsible for 
getting the appropriate people together for a management 
audit of the analysis.  This management audit ensures that 
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the information worksheet is technically correct and that 
the recommendations make sense.  Management accepts or 
rejects each recommendation and develops an implementation 
plan for those accepted.  The approved recommendations are 
entered into a Data Collection and Corrective Action 
Systems (DCACAS) and the IPTs are responsible for reviewing 
each approved DCACAS as well as taking appropriate action.   
The DCACAS is a “checks and balance” system; 
therefore, after the IPTs have taken action, reliability 
personnel have to make a final approval before the DCACAS 
can be closed.  Everyone in the program office essentially 
has access to the DCACAS database, ensuring that all 
information is easily attainable.  Specific examples of 
DCACAS recommendations include future training 
requirements, additional personal protective gear, 
incorporating warnings or cautions into technical 
documentation, reevaluation of standard operating 
procedures (SOP), updates to technical manuals, setting 
testing limitations, and physical design changes.  
Personnel responsible for developing technical manuals have 
been able to simple “cut and paste” straight from the 
DCACAS, thus making their jobs more efficient.  As of 
February 2002, the program had conducted eighteen RCM 
analyses that have resulted in more than 550 DCACAS. [Ref. 
13] 
RCM training will be more thoroughly addressed in 
subsequent paragraphs; however, as of February 2002, the 
program had conducted nine three-day RCM training sessions 
for well over one hundred DRPM-AAA/GDAMS AAAV team members. 
E. RCM OBSTACLES  
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As anyone might expect with a new way of conducting 
business, there would be initial difficulties incurred in 
the application of RCM to a prototype military vehicle in a 
joint Government/contractor environment.  Several 
difficulties were encountered, the most significant of 
which was obtaining buy-in from the management (both the 
Government and contractor) and the numerous IPTs that make 
up the program.  Additionally, an extremely ambitious 
schedule and a very tight budget did not make for the best 
environment to experiment with a new process.  
The DRPM-AAA/GDAMS AAAV development team is made up of 
more than twenty separate IPTs.  Initially, it was 
difficult to determine exactly which IPTs should 
participate in an RCM analysis, but once that was resolved, 
it was equally challenging to get the right persons to 
attend due to scheduling pressures.  Initially, many 
members perceived RCM to be “just another process” that 
someone directed them to support.  
Once the specific IPTs and the appropriate personnel 
from each IPT were identified, the next challenge would be 
to get them to attend each meeting.  Demanding schedule 
pressures coupled with the usual under-manning that exists 
in almost every acquisition program made it difficult for 
some to rationalize spending time in the RCM meeting room.  
Without the right people present, the process was slowed 
down because the expert would have to be located to answer 
certain questions.  Prior to any firsthand evidence that 
this process was worthwhile, it was difficult for many to 
accept that RCM was indeed a powerful tool that would save 
much more time than was invested into it.  
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Further adding to the resistance was the view that RCM 
had already been applied since the traditional Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) had previously been 
performed on many of the AAAV systems.  Though a FMEA 
answers questions three and four of the RCM process, 
failure to address the other five prescribed RCM questions 
makes the traditional FMEA inadequate.  RCM analysis 
accuracy and robust results would eventually prove that 
this process was not the duplication of effort as 
originally perceived but instead, was a valuable addition 
to the program’s acquisition toolkit. [Ref. 34] 
F. OVERCOMING RCM OBSTACLES 
The first step in overcoming obstacles to the RCM 
process was obtaining senior leadership buy-in.  As with 
any controversial or new process, if the leadership does 
not publicly show support, the process will fail.  The 
Program Manager understood the benefits of RCM and ensured 
the process was adhered too by supporting the RCM training 
and acknowledging the results of each analysis. [Ref. 28] 
With support from management, the originally trained 
facilitators demonstrated remarkable persistence in 
ensuring the RCM program continued to move forward.  Faced 
with the daunting task of proving that RCM worked, 
facilitators scheduled analysis and literally grabbed 
people out of their offices to participate in the review 
session.     
Each RCM analysis comes with both a monetary and 
opportunity cost since it requires the full attendance by 
each participant for the entire analysis.  During the 
analysis, each group member’s routine duties and 
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responsibilities were either handled by another or put on 
the back burner.  Most managers realized that their 
investment in the analysis was paying off since the results 
of the each analysis was so productive in terms of 
recommended tasks and proposed design changes.  RCM was 
essentially making management’s job easier.  Management’s 
acceptance and subsequent implementation of analysis 
recommendations provided the group members with a sense of 
empowerment, which further secured their support of the 
process.  
The second step in overcoming RCM obstacles was 
accomplished through training.  RCM training falls into one 
of three categories.  The first is training personnel to be 
potential analysis group members.  This training package is 
three days in length and provides group members with a 
common understanding of the RCM concept and a common 
language with respect to RCM.  Experience in both the AAAV 
program and within the Aladon network has shown that 
analyses proceed much more efficiently if all group members 
have had this training. [Ref. 13]   
A trained facilitator leads each RCM analysis.  
Facilitator training is ten days long and provides each 
student with the basic skills required to schedule and 
conduct both the RCM analysis and the management audit of 
the analysis.  A prerequisite to facilitator training is 
attendance in the three-day course and following their ten-
day training course; facilitators are mentored as they 
apply the RCM process.  Mentoring reduces the learning 
curve for the new facilitator as he or she has immediate 
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on-site support for all the issues encountered in applying 
RCM for the first few times. 
As one of the program goals was to become self-
sufficient in the RCM process, AAAV took an extra step in 
having one of their persons trained as an RCM practitioner.  
Practitioner training is fifteen days in length and upon 
successful completion; the practitioner is certified and 
able to train group members and facilitators.  The AAAV 
program has one trained practitioner and plans to train to 
two more over the next year.   
As more IPTs sent people to the group member training, 
word of mouth support for RCM began to spread.  This led to 
a number of people requesting a seat in the next RCM class.  
Some of these people were sincerely interested in learning 
about the process while others attended the classes as an 
opportunity to discredit the process.  None of the latter 
succeeded and most became converts.  [Ref. 28] 
The third hurdle in overcoming obstacles to RCM 
implementation was ownership.  Buy-in to the RCM process 
began very slowly, but with the publication of each new 
analysis and as each of the review groups saw their 
recommendations adopted, members began to show interest and 
acceptance of the process began to spread.  The RCM process 
provided a genuine sense of empowerment to the group 
members while quickly broadening their understanding of the 
AAAV.  Even as a trained RCM practitioner, the AAAV 
Maintenance Officer would be astonished by the overwhelming 
feedback the RCM-trained team members provided him:  
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As RCM education expanded, more and more people 
began to wonder if it could solve their specific 
problems.  In some cases, the problem was 
maturation of a new design.  “Will this design 
work as intended?”  “Will it do what the user 
wants it to do?”  “Is this the best solution to 
an identified design problem?”  “Will this design 
interface with other subsystems as intended?”  In 
other cases, the questions were specific.  “Can 
RCM help us determine what the embedded logistics 
administration system (ELAS) should do?”  “Can 
RCM examine the best way to design and implement 
a life cycle management information system 
(LMI)?”  And in still other cases, “Can an RCM 
analysis provide supporting documentation for a 
‘safe and ready for test’ certification?”  “Can 
this process help us ensure that testing of a 
carcinogenic material is conducted safely?”  In 
each case, the RCM process quickly and thoroughly 
provided the information each group was looking 
for and resistance to the process further 
diminished. [Ref. 32] 
Collocation would also aid in overcoming RCM obstacles 
since the team members from both Government and contractor 
interacted with each other on a daily basis.  This 
familiarity inspired face-to-face meetings that ultimately 
addressed RCM issues promptly.  Collocation fostered open 
communication that helped to build trust and mutual 
respect, which are essential, for teamwork environments 
required by both the IPT and RCM process. [Ref. 34]  
G. QUANTIFYING THE VALUE OF RCM   
It is difficult to quantify the results of RCM because 
the AAAV is a brand new system; as a result, true “savings” 
or “loss avoidance” cannot be calculated.  As RCM is being 
applied to the AAAV while it is in the prototype stage, 
there are no baselines from which to calculate any 
reductions.  [Ref. 30]  The AAAV is not an evolution of the 
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current AAV design; but a revolutionary change in virtually 
every respect.  Even though these two warfighting systems 
will perform similar missions, they are definitely not the 
same.   
In the context of the AAAV, reliability is more than 
simply ensuring the vehicle has low life cycle costs, it 
has to do with taking care of Marines by ensuring the 
vehicle performs the way it is designed.  Every time a 
change is made that affects safety, then a potential life 
has been saved.  Since AAAV is designing out failures 
before they occur, the program will never know how much 
money or how many lives RCM will have saved.  The generally 
accepted thought is that fewer Marines are likely to be 
injured or killed as a result of the recommendations made 
from the RCM analyses.  The following paragraphs attempt to 
quantify significant recommendations that were the direct 
result of RCM analysis and that would have otherwise 
possibly gone unnoticed. 
While analyzing the Power Generator system, the group 
found that the electrical boxes were designed to be easily 
unhooked to allow for quick exchange and troubleshooting.  
If the power was not disconnected from these boxes prior to 
removal, there was a very high risk that there would be a 
short to ground or an internal short in the cable due to 
the delicacy of the five-volt system.  Additionally, since 
this system is set up in a token ring arrangement, a short 
anywhere in the path would result in everything in the box 
burning up.  This seemed intuitive, but there were 
instances in which the prototypes burned these boxes 
because disconnecting the batteries was a cumbersome 
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procedure that was often omitted.  The RCM analysis 
recommended that the simple procedure of ensuring the 
batteries were fully disconnected eliminated the burning of 
the electrical boxes.  Furthermore, the analysis 
recommended a design change that resulted in a much more 
efficient method to disconnect the batteries. 
During the same Power Generator analysis, the group 
also discovered that there was a software reset toggle 
switch among the four other switches that controlled power 
generation.  The engineers had believed that the crew 
required a reset switch that could be activated in the 
event of software problems.  This same switch was now 
causing problems.  First, if the switch failed in the 
closed position the vehicle would not start.  Second, if 
the toggle was tripped while the engine was running, the 
vehicle would shut down.  Starting the vehicle is like 
booting a computer; it takes between three to five minutes 
to start.  The engineers may have been correct in assuming 
that the Marines would need a software reset button, but 
failed to consider the operating context of having Marines 
in Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) gear with 
packs and all their equipment.  With the added physical 
restrictions of wearing MOPP gear in a confined area, the 
crew might inadvertently bump into the switch, thus making 
accidental activation of the reset button highly likely.  
The group simply recommended that the switch be eliminated 
and that the existing switch be used for egress lighting.      
During the Power Distribution analysis, the group 
discovered that an electrical failure might affect the 
scroll of the automated maps that the crewmembers use to 
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navigate.  In an over the horizon (OTH) water march of up 
to twenty-five miles, this could result in a vehicle 
getting lost.  The group recommended that the crew receive 
OTH instruction (dead reckoning and celestial navigation) 
reinforced with competency-based training.  The designers 
had not thought about how the Marines would deal with that 
situation.   
During that same Power Distribution analysis, the 
group found several failure modes that had to do with 
losing power in the surf.  They realized that if power was 
lost at this point, the waves would batter the vehicle and 
everything that was not lashed down would become a flying 
object that could potentially injure or kill someone.  The 
engineers had never thought about any significant measures 
for lashing to protect the embarked Marines aboard this 
vehicle.  On the old AAV, the Marines hung their gear on 
bustle racks located on the outside of the vehicle.  With 
the AAAV they cannot do that for signature reasons and 
because gear would be likely to be ripped off.  The Marines 
have to store their gear between sponsons, which are just 
open spaces.  The group recommended that “spider nets,” 
similar to those found in the trunks of cars to prevent 
groceries from splashing about be installed to contain the 
packs and equipment in the event of sudden stops or 
rollovers.  While the idea of putting spider nets in the 
AAAV seems unrelated to a Power Distribution analysis, the 
RCM process precipitates this kind of analysis.   
During the Hydraulic analysis, the group discovered 
that when changing from transition to water mode or vice 
versa, there are several appendages that must be 
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hydraulically moved.  The RCM analysis revealed that once 
this automatic sequence was started, there was no provision 
for the driver to stop the deployment.  The group 
visualized these flaps deploying and possibly striking a 
submerged object.  The group recommended that the software 
design be changed to include an abort option after the 
selection of the appendage stop button.   
Prior to prototype testing at Marine Corps Base, 
Twentynine Palms, the RCM process was used to look at the 
vehicle in the operating context of being operated by 
Marines, carrying infantrymen in the harsh desert 
environment.  The entire system was analyzed for potential 
safety problems.  The result was the identification of one 
hundred twenty failure modes that could directly contribute 
to someone being killed.  Based on the RCM group 
recommendations, an SOP was developed that included test 
limitations, changes were made to the technical manuals, 
and several changes were made to the design to improve 
safety during operations in the desert.  As a result of 
further analysis for the same desert testing, the group 
recommended that the cooling system be refurbished.  
Previously, the vehicle had experienced one leak for every 
forty-five minutes of operation.  As a result of design 
changes, the vehicle returned from several months of 
testing with no leaks and no one was injured or killed.   
An analysis was conducted on the new bow flap design 
for the program’s first System Development and 
Demonstration (SDD) vehicle.  The bow flap had never been 
built or used and since the designers were close to being 
done with it, the program office wanted to apply RCM before 
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it was completed.  The group came up with a number of 
recommendations that would increase the chance that the bow 
flap would work the first time.  Most of the 
recommendations dealt with testing and characterization of 
the new flap, which, if implemented, would provide them 
with both a better feel for operations in the open ocean 
and the opportunity to make the bow flap more reliable 
prior to testing.  
There are numerous examples where RCM analysis has led 
to changes intended to increase the vehicle reliability, 
but as these previous examples showed, RCM was also 
instrumental in analyzing human factors, safety, software 
design and even designs that hadn’t been completed. [Ref. 
34]    
H. LONG RUN EXPECTATIONS  
The long run expectations of the impact of applying 
RCM in the acquisition of the AAAV are that the Marine 
Corps will receive a reliable asset that will perform its 
specified missions safely as designed while not being a 
burden to maintain.  RCM makes the program look at the 
effects of failure to ensure that each failure management 
policy is sensible.  Effects are always looked at from the 
worst-case perspective; that way, if something less than 
worst case happens, the Marine crew and their vehicle 
should be unharmed.  If the worst case does happen, the 
consequences will not be a surprise because they will have 
been anticipated and mitigated to the extent possible. 
Based on the results experienced by both NAVAIR and 
the Royal Navy, the program expects RCM to provide at least 
a thirty to forty percent reduction in the amount of 
  48 
scheduled maintenance compared to that being performed on 
its predecessor, the AAV7-A1.  At the same time the amount 
of consumables used and hazardous materials generated will 
also decrease.  Availability is expected to be higher so 
there will be improved readiness for less effort.  RCM data 
will also help to determine the optimal amount of component 
sparing needed to maintain readiness goals.    
The AAAV program intends to continue to apply RCM 
throughout the remainder of the acquisition.  The 
application of RCM has had clear benefits.  The sum of the 
analyses will play an integral part in determining the 
final maintenance plan.  The program office intends to 
continue applying RCM throughout the life of the AAAV.  
Once the system is fielded, there will be a point where the 
level of effort decreases, but it should not stop entirely 
because people will always want to make changes.  As long 
as the planning or the potential exists to make changes to 
the platform design, RCM should be part of the process, 
because it provides a structured approach within which to 
evaluate those changes.   
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IV. ANALYSIS OF RCM AND ITS APPLICATION IN THE AAAV 
PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter discusses the results presented in 
Chapters II and III.  The focus of the analysis is on the 
primary thesis question: What have been the results of 
applying the RCM process in the acquisition of the Marine 
Corps AAAV and what are the reliability expectations 
associated with the further development, production and 
deployment of the AAAV?  The analysis will include the 
reasons for success in the AAAV program, the benefits of 
RCM and finally the negative considerations of RCM.  
B. WHY HAS RCM WORKED FOR THE AAAV PROGRAM?    
It is the author’s opinion that RCM has worked for the 
AAAV program due to a strong commitment from the program 
leadership, highly proficient facilitators, mentoring, in 
house RCM training, organizational structure and location, 
and the use of IPTs.   
1. Program Leadership 
Senior leadership is probably the most important 
factor in RCM, followed closely by persistence.  Without 
the support from top, culture change will not occur and no 
process will survive.  Colonel Nans’ support of RCM and his 
guidance to the AAAV program’s senior leadership that the 
process was worthwhile were instrumental in getting RCM off 
the ground.  Similarly, the first groups of facilitators 
(the “RCM pioneers at AAAV”) were extremely persistent in 
scheduling analysis and rounding up people to participate 
in the review groups.  Without this persistence, the 
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process would have languished and eventually died. [Ref. 
28] 
2. Facilitators  
Without properly trained facilitators to guide each 
analysis, RCM would have failed.  The facilitators are the 
experts in RCM and thus ensure the entire process is 
understood and applied by the group.  The program found out 
early that not everyone is cut out to be a facilitator.  
The facilitator must also have the support of their 
leadership, especially if this billet is a collateral duty.  
Collateral duties often lead to conflicts in priorities 
since the facilitator may feel competing pressures to 
complete both an analysis as well as the regular assigned 
duties.  In this case, there is the danger that one or both 
will suffer.  Leadership must also be patient since there 
is a learning curve for a facilitator to climb before 
proficiency and quality are achieved. [Ref. 13] 
3. Mentoring 
Mentoring helps to alleviate the challenges 
facilitators have to face.  The AAAV program maintains 
monthly ties to Aladon to ensure its facilitators are 
performing as intended by RCM II.  The bottom line is if 
you do not understand the logic, then you can’t apply the 
process.  Mentoring assists the facilitators’ in learning 
how to better focus and ensure the process is performed as 
required.  This is essential when working with 
inexperienced RCM team members who “don’t know what they 
don’t know” and the probability of “getting it wrong” is 
very high. [Ref. 13] 
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4. Training  
Though the program has found that RCM training is not 
a prerequisite for a member to participate in an analysis, 
the training does speed up the analysis process.  
Additionally, the in-house RCM training has added a 
personal touch to use of RCM.  Facilitators can use 
specific examples from the previous AAAV analysis to add to 
the generic examples provided with the course.  This is 
usually the first opportunity to address the skeptics.  In 
a few cases, the hardcore doubters are not convinced of the 
power of RCM until they complete an actual analysis, but 
the training is essential in ensuring the analysis flows 
smoothly.  After the training, the non-believers at least 
understand the process they will go through, regardless of 
their faith in it. [Ref. 13]   
5. Organizational Structure and Location  
The collocation of Government and contract personnel 
greatly facilitates the use of IPTs in the AAAV program.  
Since RCM fits so well into the IPT process, this 
collocation further strengthens the RCM process.  All the 
group members know each other since they interact on a 
daily basis.  This fosters rapid and open communication.  
All program personnel can be immediately aware of proposed 
design changes or if something is not working right; 
personnel from either side of the program can walk to the 
other’s office to resolve an issue. [Ref. 34] 
6. Integrated Product Teams 
One of the cornerstones of the DoD acquisition reform 
effort that was initiated in the mid 1990s was the move to 
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operate in Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) rather than 
functional stovepipe organizations found in many DoD 
programs.  IPTs are a great idea in that they involve all 
the necessary mix of people to make sound technical 
decisions.  In the case of the AAAV program, there was 
still a lot of wasted effort in IPTs.  That is, even with 
qualified technical personnel, activities might be 
performed two or three times over because they did not get 
things right the first time.  RCM fits perfectly into the 
IPT forum because both processes require a group of 
specialized personnel coming together to solve problems.  
RCM just takes it one step further by providing the needed 
focus that gives IPTs a big advantage towards getting it 
right the first time.  There is a lot of positive feedback 
from the IPT members exposed to the RCM process.  It would 
have been more difficult to get RCM off the ground without 
the current IPT process already in place. [Ref. 28] 
C. BENEFITS OF RCM 
The benefits of RCM II are summed up by John Moubray’s 
book, Reliability-centered Maintenance: 
Widely recognized by maintenance professionals as 
the most cost-effective way to develop world-
class maintenance strategies.  RCM leads to 
rapid, sustained, and substantial improvements in 
plant availability and reliability, product 
quality, safety, and environmental integrity. 
[Ref. 6] 
Interviews with personnel involved in the AAAV’s RCM 
program have indicated that RCM II has provided similar 
benefits in many applications around the world.  In 
particular, program staff has gained a much more granular 
understanding of exactly what each IPT wants in terms of 
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performance from each sub-system.  Additionally, IPTs have 
a much clearer understanding of the effects of each failure 
mode and as a result, have achieved a better focus on where 
to spend maintenance time.  RCM II has provided a 
structured approach for understanding and analyzing 
proposed design changes and provided an efficient process 
for quickly addressing operational risk.  In spite of 
traditional thinking that suggests massive amounts of usage 
data are required to analyze maintenance, RCM II has proven 
its value in the absence of such data and proven that RCM 
can be usefully applied as late as the System Development 
and Demonstration phase.    
1. Better Understanding of Failure Mode Effects and 
How to Minimize Them  
As mentioned in Chapter II, once functional failures 
have been identified, RCM identifies all the events that 
are reasonably likely to cause each failed state.  We know 
these events as failure modes and once they are identified, 
then it is possible to consider what happens when they 
occur, assess the consequences, and decide what should be 
done before they actually happen.  With the AAAV, the 
examples of the software-reset toggle switch removal, the 
need for over the horizon (OTH) training for crew, the 
installation of spider nets, and the abort option for 
transition to and from water mode are all examples of 
identifying failure modes (many before they actually 
occurred) and managing them proactively. [Ref. 34]  
2. Better Focus on Where to Spend Maintenance Time 
The objective of a successful preventive maintenance 
program should be to prevent or mitigate the consequences 
of failures and not to prevent the failures themselves.  
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RCM analyzes the effects or consequences of the possible 
failure modes and evaluates their effect on safety, the 
environment, operations, or cost.  Since the program is 
utilizing RCM in the development of the AAAV, program 
staffs are more likely to define functions in the proper 
context, and subsequently develop a practical preventive 
maintenance program that will ensure the system performs 
the way it was intended.  Additionally, once the analysis 
results have cleared the DCACAS process, technical 
documentation is updated thus ensuring quality in future 
operational and maintenance publications.        
3. Structured Approach for Understanding and 
Analyzing Proposed or Needed Changes in Design, 
Processes and Procedures 
SAE JA1011 states that in order to be called  “RCM,” a 
process must obtain satisfactory answers to the seven 
questions presented in Chapter II.  Since these questions 
must be asked in order, there is little chance of logical 
or procedural flaws in the analysis.  With the AAAV, these 
potential flaws could lead to safety or environmental 
accidents that could contribute to injuries or death of 
Marines or substantial environmental damage.  The 
electrical box example from the Power Generator system 
analysis demonstrates the benefits of following the 
structured approach of RCM.  Additionally, it was evident 
in the overwhelming feedback from RCM-trained members to 
the program Maintenance Officer that the structured RCM 
process is not only easy to understand, but easy to adapt 
and apply to different designs, processes, or procedures. 
[Ref. 34] 
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4. Common Point of Understanding for Addressing 
Operational Risk Areas that Will Result in 
Improved System Readiness 
One of the pillars of RCM is safety.  If the 
consequences of failure include either safety or 
environmental effects, then redesign is compulsory.  In the 
context of the AAAV, reliability is more than low life 
cycle costs.  Reliability also has to do with taking care 
of Marines by ensuring risk is minimized.  The inclusion of 
a spider net for storing equipment is one example which 
demonstrates that even though the RCM analysis was focused 
on the Power Distribution system, the RCM trained team 
members were able to recognize a potential hazard and 
recommend a design change to mitigate the risk.  [Ref. 34]  
5. Timely Benefits 
As discussed in Chapter II, if RCM is correctly 
applied, results are quick to follow.  Success is even more 
likely to come to those who thoroughly plan as well as 
carefully consider how and by whom the analysis is 
performed, audited and implemented.  Though the AAAV 
program failed to complete the proposed number of analyses 
in their original pilot program due to the underestimating 
of the system complexity, they did experience immediate 
results from the analyses completed.  With the example of 
the first analysis of the Marine Drive Steering system, the 
team was able to solve the uncommanded steering problem 
that had not been recognized until then. [Ref. 34]  
6. Never Too Late to Apply RCM 
As discussed in Chapter II, RCM II has been very 
successful in that it has been applied to over 1400 
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organizations in more than 40 countries.  Since RCM II is a 
zero based process, it requires no preliminary failure data 
to conduct an analysis.  The concept of accurately 
analyzing mechanical systems without the perceived benefit 
of extensive failure data and past maintenance history has 
been proven by RCM II.  Some would argue that its 
impossible to accurately analyze systems before actual 
performance data is accumulated and because of this, would 
further suggest that RCM cannot be applied in the early 
stages of development.  However, because of its proven 
track record in both civilian and military applications as 
well as the appeal of being zero based, (appealing because 
in PDRR, the program had virtually no maintenance history) 
the AAAV program initiated the RCM process late in the PDRR 
phase.  [Ref. 28] 
As described in Chapter III, the RCM teams were 
surprised by the recommendations that flowed from their 
analyses.  Given the immediate success in spite of its 
“late” application, the AAAV program can only speculate as 
to what greater impact RCM may have had on the program if 
it was initiated earlier in the program.  Future 
acquisition programs may want to consider the potential 
advantages of being able to influence the asset design 
early enough to avoid costly mistakes and before a single 
drawing is released to a vendor for production.  Just as 
the program has demonstrated that it is never too early 
(through their successful analysis of the bow flap design) 
to apply RCM, the AAAV program has also demonstrated that 
it is never too late (regardless of the fact that the 
prototypes had been designed, built and were operating by 
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the time RCM was introduced) to apply RCM and reap both 
short term and long term benefits.  [Ref. 34] 
 
D. NEGATIVE CONSIDERATIONS OF RCM 
Though RCM appears to be on firm ground with the AAAV 
program, there are drawbacks that should be taken into 
consideration.  There are financial and opportunity costs 
involved in the process, there is the temptation to 
shortcut the process, and it is difficult to obtain buy-in. 
1. Financial Cost 
RCM costs money to implement.  RCM II is the 
proprietary intellectual property of John Moubray and it is 
not free.  Some people would look at the price tag and be 
turned off.  The initial pilot program, which included 
technical support and training facilitators, cost the 
program $150,000 and the subsequent contract to continue 
the technical support of analysis and train practitioners 
was an additional $250,000.  Though these costs appear 
substantial, one must consider them in the context of a 
multi-billion dollar program that will produce more than 
one thousand AAAVs, each costing around five million 
dollars.  RCM has already paid for itself in the short term 
in many ways described in Chapter III, but in the long run, 
the program office expects that RCM will pay for itself 
many times over. [Ref. 28]      
2. Opportunity Costs  
Besides the direct monetary costs, there are also 
opportunity costs that might not have a specific price tag 
associated with them, but nonetheless will cost the 
organization in terms of personnel availability and short-
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term productivity.  As discussed previously, RCM analyses 
take time.  Acquisition programs do not historically have a 
lot of “spare” time, so something has to give.  All of the 
group members and facilitators have other responsibilities, 
so there are not any personnel who are solely dedicated to 
RCM.  In order for the process to work as intended, 
Government and contractor leaders must adjust schedules and 
demands to account for the time their people spend on RCM 
analysis.  [Ref. 28] 
At the AAAV office, the leadership has this 
understanding and accepts this inconvenience as an 
investment that will pay off in the future.  For example, 
as a result of RCM analyses, technicians supporting the 
vehicle gained an in-depth understanding as to how, 
exactly, the system works and more specifically, what 
effects certain failures have on the system.  As a result 
of this increase in their knowledge, they were able to 
diagnose and repair the vehicle much quicker, thus saving 
expensive test site time.  Moreover, in addition to the 
reduction in repair times measured by the program’s 
reliability personnel, RCM recommendations led to a 
decrease in induced failures as discussed in Chapter III. 
Because of the details contained in the RCM information 
worksheets, technical manual developers are able to “cut 
and paste” information, as opposed to conducting interviews 
with various designers.  Additionally, RCM analyses of 
“virtual” designs uncovered flaws that were corrected 
before designs were released, thus avoiding the tremendous 
expense of building the “wrong” component.  [Ref. 34] 
3. Temptation to Make Shortcuts in the RCM Process  
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Though the AAAV program leadership and team members 
understand the importance of conducting RCM correctly, step 
by step, it would be very tempting to shortcut the process 
to save both time and money.  This is especially tempting 
when there are so-called expert consultants advertising the 
same results in “much less time.”  However, the RCM process 
is surprisingly fast, if properly applied and facilitated.  
Shortcutting the process, by adopting one of the 
derivatives of RCM discussed in Chapter II, may initially 
appear to save time, but considering the possibility of 
disastrous consequences along with the threat of having to 
redo an analysis after an accident, then doing it right the 
first time is the only logical choice. [Ref. 8]  
4. Obtaining Buy-In  
The AAAV program overcame the buy-in issue, but it 
must be stressed that, initially, this was a difficult 
obstacle to overcome.  Programs that choose to apply RCM to 
their processes and systems must be prepared to face this 
challenge or RCM will not be successful.  Most of the buy-
in challenge can be attributed to the necessary culture 
change in the acquisition profession from standard FMEAs to 
RCM, since there appears to be duplication in effort to 
those unfamiliar with what RCM really is.  All of the 
points made in section B of this chapter worked together to 
overcome these types of obstacles and the successes from 
RCM thus far have helped institutionalize it in the AAAV 
program.  If any RCM results had been unsuccessful, there 
is a good possibility that RCM would have never been 
accepted within the AAAV program office.  Buy-in will 
likely be a difficult factor to overcome in future 
programs. [Ref. 34] 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The objective of this research effort was to examine 
the program decision to utilize Reliability Centered 
Maintenance (RCM) in the Marine Corps Advanced Amphibious 
Assault Vehicle (AAAV) program.  The goal was to determine 
what impact this decision has had on the AAAV program, the 
future implications of the decision, and to determine if 
this decision could benefit other defense acquisition 
programs.   
Background information on RCM was presented followed 
by a review of the RCM application in the AAAV program.  
This chapter will draw conclusions from the research effort 
and subsequent analysis that has been presented.  
Recommendations will then be made as to how lessons learned 
from the AAAV program may be applied to other acquisitions 
programs.  Finally, areas for further research will be 
presented.     
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. RCM Provides a Sound Understanding of the AAAV as 
a System 
RCM is more than just a process that leads to an 
effective maintenance program.  The application of RCM in 
the acquisition of the AAAV has led to better system 
performance through more complete understanding of systems, 
to include increased awareness in risk, safety and 
environmental issues.  By simply answering the seven RCM 
questions in a group led by a trained RCM facilitator, as 
prescribed by SAE JA1011, each IPT can potentially gain a 
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more complete and in-depth understanding of the AAAV as a 
system.  Because RCM requires a disciplined, focused and 
systematic approach to each analysis, there is less room 
for error and a greater chance of “getting the design 
right” the first time.  This saves time and money, which 
any acquisition program should appreciate.  Additionally, 
RCM II places great emphasis on safety and environmental 
awareness.  The AAAV program has proven the risk awareness 
value of RCM by consistently identifying hazards or 
concerns that had been previously overlooked.  
2. The Earlier RCM is Applied, the Greater the 
Benefits It Will Deliver 
Since RCM is zero based (i.e., requires no historical 
maintenance data or history), the AAAV program team members 
would have preferred to apply the process earlier in the 
acquisition cycle to have better influenced the design and 
avoided costly problems that eventually surfaced.  Since 
RCM was not introduced until late in PDRR, it was applied 
to three prototypes that had been designed, built and were 
operating.  Regardless of the timing, program staff did 
find that RCM helped them better understand the AAAV and 
changes could still be made to influence increased 
readiness and availability, with decreased safety and 
environmental risks.  
3. It is Never Too Late to Incorporate the RCM 
Process 
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, RCM should be 
applied as early in the acquisition cycle as practical, but 
the AAAV program has also proved that RCM may be applied 
with good benefits, even after some of the initial system 
design work has been completed.  Although the process is 
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ideally suited to analyze existing systems and equipment, 
it is equally powerful analyzing concepts and designs.  
Because it is a living program, RCM will help ensure that 
an effective and economical maintenance strategy follows 
AAAV through its life cycle.  
4. The RCM Process is Not Limited to Just 
Maintenance Analysis 
The name Reliability Centered Maintenance can mislead 
those who do not fully understand the definition of 
“maintenance” because it appears to limit the RCM process 
to the physical reliability of an asset.  If “maintenance” 
is defined as “the process of ensuring that something 
continues to do what the user wants it to do,” the scope of 
RCM expands dramatically.  The AAAV program has found that 
RCM is a versatile process and has expanded its application 
to include analyzing human factors, safety, software design 
and even projects that were merely concepts.  None of these 
were specifically related to the maintenance plan of a 
physical asset.   
5. RCM Requires an Environment for Success 
RCM succeeded in the AAAV program because of a strong 
commitment from the program leadership, highly proficient 
facilitators, effective mentoring, in-house RCM training, 
organizational structure and location, and the use of IPTs.  
Though some points are more important than others, all of 
these factors contributed to the successful implementation 
of RCM into the AAAV program.  The committed leadership in 
AAAV provided the environment and the forcing function that 
resulted in imposition of all the other facets necessary 
for success.  Leadership commitment is the sine qua non.  
My conclusion is that if the leadership will does not buy-
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in and become the “champion” of RCM, the effort is destined 
to wither and die, and should not be started in the first 
place. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. RCM be Institutionalized in DoD Acquisitions 
The USD(AT&L) should mandate RCM, as prescribed by SAE 
JA1011, for all acquisition programs.  The process has a 
proven track record in both civilian and military 
applications.  Specifically, acquisitions can expect 
reduced program cost, savings in time, greater asset 
reliability, and increased safety and environmental 
awareness.  Absent any DoD-wide guidance on how RCM should 
be specifically applied, the Commander, Marine Corps 
Material Command should take advantage of the expertise and 
experience of the personnel involved in the AAAV RCM 
program to develop a service specific policy on RCM.  RCM 
is broader than but inclusive of Failure Modes and Effects 
Analyses (FMEA) and Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality 
Analyses (FMECA).  Replacing current acquisition 
requirements to perform FMEA/FMECA with RCM should form the 
basis of the guidance.  Consideration should also be given 
to establishing an RCM program office and applying RCM to 
fielded systems. 
2. Apply RCM as Early as Practical in the 
Acquisition Process 
RCM should be applied as early as practical in an 
acquisition program to successfully influence design and 
ultimately start with a “better” product.  The Component 
Advanced Development phase appears to be a logical starting 
point, since this is where subsystems and components are 
demonstrated before being integrated into a system.  RCM 
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should be used to ensure appropriate focus is given to 
understanding functions and standards of performance.  
3. If You Cannot Apply RCM Early, It is “O.K.” to 
Apply It Later 
Regardless of the current phase, acquisition programs 
should consider applying RCM to their program.  AAAV has 
proven that later application of RCM still yielded 
significant benefits.  Even if the asset is fielded, a RCM 
analysis will reveal opportunity for cost savings and 
improved reliability.  The experience of NAVAIR (PMA-260) 
in applying RCM to support equipment is just one example of 
post fielding success.  
4. In Addition to Maintenance Planning, Recognize 
the Power of RCM in a Broader Sense 
RCM should be considered for more than just developing 
efficient maintenance programs.  RCM can be used to test 
the feasibility of a new policy, gain appropriate risk 
awareness, examine software schemes, and confirm design 
concepts before any of these plans are set in stone.  Once 
the RCM process is applied, the variety of potential 
applications becomes more evident. 
5. Provide the Proper Environment for RCM Success 
Those who embark on RCM must provide the proper 
leadership attention and support needed to overcome the 
challenges, primarily that of culture change of doing 
things differently, in order to achieve success.  RCM 
requires a strong commitment from leaders, patience in 
training qualified facilitators, the support of mentors, 
and an investment in training.  Additionally, those 
interested should ensure that the RCM process is in 
compliance with SAE JA1011, since there are organizations 
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that take advantage of the RCM name without providing the 
prescribed service. 
 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
As a result of this research effort, the author has 
identified the following areas for further research that 
could be performed by NPS students: 
· Once AAAV fielding is complete, consider 
reviewing the final RCM advantages and 
disadvantages and publish lessons learned. 
· Research whether RCM could be applied to existing 
Marine Corps ground equipment.  Consider a cost 
benefit analysis to determine the extent to which 
a selection of Marine Corps ground equipment 
would benefit from its application. 
· Consider the feasibility of establishing a RCM 
policy and program for the Marine Corps.  Does 
the Marine Corps have the infrastructure to 
incorporate RCM?  Can the Marine Corps afford (or 
not afford) to institutionalize RCM?  Who would 
be responsible and what would it take? 
· Examine other programs experience with RCM.  Can 
a consensus be drawn that would support 
institutionalizing RCM into all acquisitions?   
· Study the policies, guidance, and instructions 
published by the DoD related to ensuring 
reliability within DoD acquisition programs.  
Consider a comparative analysis of DoD employed 
methodologies compared to methodologies employed 
in commercial industry.      
· Compare DoD-wide RCM initiatives to better 
understand the different levels of success each 
service has experienced. 
· Investigate how receptive major defense 
contractors would be toward replacing FMEA/FMECA 
with RCM, to determine if RCM might be mandated 
in other programs. 
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APPENDIX.  LIST OF ACRONYMS 
AAAV Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle 
AAV Amphibious Assault Vehicle 
ACAT Acquisition Strategy 
 
CAIV Cost as an Independent Variable 
CE Concept Exploration 
CPEFH Cost per Engine Flying Hour 
 
DCACAS Data Collection and Corrective Action System 
DoD Department of Defense 
DoDD Department of Defense Directive 
DRPM-AAA Direct Reporting Program Manager, Advanced 
 Amphibious Assault 
ELAS Embedded Logistics Administration System 
EPA Environmental Protection Agency 
 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
FMECA Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality 
Analysis 
GDAMS General Dynamics Amphibious Systems 
 
IPPD Integrated Product and Process Development 
IPT Integrated Product Team 
 
LMI Logistics Management Information 
 
MOPP Mission Oriented Protective Posture 
MSG Maintenance Steering Group 
 
NAVAIR Naval Air Systems Command 
NDIA National Defense Industrial Association 
NPS Naval Postgraduate School 
 
ORD Operational Requirements Document 
OTH Over the Horizon 
 
PDRR Program Definition and Risk Reduction 
PM Program Manager 
PMO Program Management Office 
PMO Planned Maintenance Optimization 
 
RCM Reliability Centered Maintenance 
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SAE Society of Automotive Engineers 
SDD System Development and Demonstration 
SECNAVINST Secretary of the Navy Instruction 
SOP Standard Operating Procedure 
SSS System/Subsystem Specification 
 
USCGC United States Coast Guard Cutter 
USD Under Secretary of Defense 
USMC United States Marine Corps 
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